





The Chinese Corporate Savings Puzzle:  
A Firm-level Cross-country Perspective 
 




China’s high corporate savings rate is commonly claimed to be a key driver for the 
country’s large current account surplus. The mainstream explanation for high corporate 
savings is a combination of windfall profits in state-owned firms, especially in resource 
sectors, and mis-governance of state-owned firms represented by their low dividend payout. 
The paper casts doubt on these views by comparing the savings of 1557 Chinese listed firms 
with those of 29330 listed firms from 51 other countries over 2002 to 2007. First, Chinese 
firms do not have a significantly higher savings rate than the global average because 
corporations in most countries have a high savings rate. The rising corporate savings rate is 
also consistent with a global trend. Second, there is no significant difference in the savings 
behavior and dividend patterns between Chinese majority state-owned and private listed firms, 
contrary to the received wisdom. 
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China’s national savings rate, at 50% of GDP in 2007, is among the world’s highest 
for any economy of a significant size. This has been said to be an underlying cause of the U.S. 
housing price bubble during 2002-2007 (Bernanke, 2005; and Greenspan, 2009), and by 
extension, of the current global financial crisis. This illustrates the attention that has been paid 
to global implications of China’s savings issue. It is therefore useful to understand China’s 
high savings rate. 
Several authors have noted that a significant part of China’s high national savings rate 
come from its large corporate savings, which by 2007 accounted for roughly half of the 
national savings. According to Hofman and Kuijs (2006), what makes China stands out is the 
high savings by its enterprises. Furthermore, low dividend payments by state owned 
enterprises (SOEs), due to a large-scale agency problem, are the primary cause of the large 
corporate savings. Martin Wolf, an influential Financial Times commentator, asserts 
(Financial Times, October 3, 2006) “But we must then also ask why China is running such 
large surpluses. ... the frugality of Chinese households is not the chief explanation for China’s 
surplus savings ..., the principal explanation is China’s huge corporate savings.”   
As far as we can see, the first claim – that the large corporate savings rate in China is 
what drives its high national savings relative to other countries – is based on the flow-of-funds 
data released by China’s National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), which cannot be checked 
independently by a third party. When it issued revisions to the flow of funds data, the 
magnitude of the revisions could be large. For example, the recent revision in 2009 changed 
the Chinese corporate savings in 2003 from 13% to 18% of GDP, or a revision on the order of 
US$ 700 billion. The second claim – that a combination of windfall profits received by state-
owned enterprises and their low dividend payout due to mis-governance – is based mostly on 
a hunch, as we have not seen any study that formally compares the profits and dividend 
practices across Chinese firms by ownership and sector. 
In this paper, we examine these claims by adopting a firm-level cross-country 
perspective: comparing the savings patterns between 1557 Chinese publicly listed firms with 
29330 listed firms in 51 other countries during 2002-2007, and comparing state-owned 
enterprises with majority privately-owned firms within China. Unlike the NBS flow-of-funds 




listed firms, collectively, are also an important part of the economy. According to the China 
Security Regulatory Commission (October 4
th, 2009), the profits of the listed firms’ revenues 
accounted for 37.7% of the GDP in 2008, and their profits accounted for 36.3% of all 
enterprise profits. As far as we know, this is the first paper that adopts the firm-level 
comparative perspective. 
Our results cast doubt on the reliability of both claims. First, we find that Chinese 
listed firms do not seem to have higher gross savings (as a share of total assets) than listed 
firms in other countries during our sample period. Moreover, the gross savings rate for a 
typical listed Chinese firm declined from 2002 to 2007, albeit insignificantly, even though 
China’s current account surplus rose significantly over the same period. This is inconsistent 
with the view that a rise in the corporate savings rate drives China’s rising current account 
surplus. Second, from a comparison of state-owned versus non-state Chinese firms, we do not 
find significant differences between these two groups in terms of their savings and dividend 
patterns. If anything, privately owned firms appear to have a higher savings rate on average.  
The finding that the Chinese corporate savings rates are not much higher than those in 
other countries is not surprising from the viewpoint of the empirical corporate finance 
literature in recent years. For example, J.P. Morgan (2005) and the IMF (2005) have noted 
that corporations in G-7 economies have all exhibited a rise in undistributed profits. Bates, 
Kahle and Stulz (2009) note that a typical firm in the United States had so much cash holdings 
by 2005 that it could pay off its entire corporate debt and still have some cash left over.  The 
corporate finance literature does not presume that high corporate savings per se reflect 
inefficiency or corporate mis-governance. Indeed, Bates et al. hypothesize that it could be a 
rational (optimal) response to rising working capital needs faced by corporations. Moreover, 
Fama and French (2001) document a pattern of disappearing dividends in the U.S. from 1978 
to 1999. The fraction of firms paying cash dividends falls from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 
1999. Part of the reason is a rising population of small firms with strong growth opportunities.  
Hoberg and Prabhala (2007) argue that a rising risk and therefore an increased need for risk 
control are the main explanation. Interestingly, the studies that focus on Chinese corporate 
savings rates appear unaware of this literature and of the fact that the high corporate savings 
rates in China are part of the global phenomenon.  
The firm-level comparative approach in this paper has its limitations. In particular, it 




correct through the actions by non-listed firms. We note, however, that most non-listed firms 
are private firms. If the savings by non-listed Chinese firms are much higher than non-listed 
firms in other countries, it is unlikely to be driven primarily by the mis-governance issues 
associated with state-owned firms. A more likely candidate would be financial constraints 
faced by privately-owned firms. In any case, our results should be interpreted with the caveat 
that non-listed firms are not part of the analysis.
2 
Our findings have important implications for policy discussions. First, the existing 
claims advocate that state-owned firms need to pay more dividends. But if they save for 
whatever reasons that have led non-state-owned Chinese firms and firms in other countries to 
save, then forcing them to do less could lower economic efficiency. Second, the existing 
claims have led to the view that Chinese corporate savings are the primary driver for its large 
current account surplus, and a reduction in corporate savings would be key to reducing the 
current account surplus. However, if the Chinese corporate savings rates are actually not much 
higher than in other countries, then one needs to turn to households and government savings 
in understanding cross-country differences in national savings. As an analogy, even though 
the skin is the biggest part of an elephant’s body, to understand why an elephant doesn’t run 
as fast as a leopard, we would not want to focus on an elephant’s skin. Similarly, even though 
Chinese corporate savings is the biggest part of its national savings, it need not be the driver 
for why the Chinese national savings rate is so much higher than other countries.   
The rest of the paper is organized in the following way. In Section 2, we analyze 
savings patterns with macro-level data based on flow of funds or national income accounts. In 
Section 3, we turn to firm-level data when we have a much better way to control for various 
determinants of corporate savings, and can separate gross versus net corporate savings. In 
Section 4, we conclude. 
 
                                                            
2 Also, our results examine the level of savings but not the quality of its allocation.  Future research can further 
examine whether Chinese enterprises use their savings more or less efficiently than firms in other countries, 




2. The Patterns from the Flow-of-Funds  Data 
We start by presenting patterns of corporate savings rates from the flow-of-funds data 
for China from the CEIC dataset from 1992 to 2007 (the latest available data), the same 
dataset used in Hofman and Kuijs (2006) and virtually all other papers on the topic in the 
literature. Figure 1 presents China’s national savings rate (total savings/GDP) during this 
period, and decomposes it into gross corporate savings, gross household savings and gross 
government savings. Corporate as a share of GDP rose over time from 11.7% in 1992 
onwards, peaked at 23.5% in 2004, and declined gradually thereafter to 18.8% in 2007.  The 
household savings as a share of GDP experienced more ups and downs. It became less 
important than corporate savings in 2003 and 2004, but exceeded corporate savings again 
after 2005. 
In spite of limitations about the flow-of-funds data, it may be useful to perform some 
simple cross country comparisons based on the macro data.  The top panel of Figure 2 
compares the aggregate corporate gross savings (as a share of assets) from 1995-2007 for 
China, Japan, Korea, Germany, Australia, United Kingdom, and the United States. The 
Chinese data show a faster increase in the savings rate up to 2004 which then started to 
decline in the next three years. Note that the corporate savings rates in Japan and Korea are 
higher than China’s in every year during the sample period. In fact, in most years, the Chinese 
aggregate gross corporate savings rate tends to be lower than the Japanese corporate savings 
rate by about 5% of GDP, and lower than the Korean corporate savings rate by about 10% of 
GDP. 
The lower panel of Figure 2 plots the net savings rates (gross savings/asset – 
investment/asset) for the same set of countries. The most striking feature is that China is the 
only economy in the group that has a significantly negative net savings rate in every single 
year. This reflects not only the high investment rates in China, but also the greater desire to 
hoard cash by firms in other economies (rather than to invest or to issue dividends).  Overall, 
what stands out the most is not how much more Chinese firms save than their counterparts in 
other economies, but how much less they save, conditional on the investment need. (One may 
argue about whether Chinese investment is more or less efficient than investments elsewhere, 
but one cannot conclude that the corporate sector in China, on net, has contributed more to its 




Besides corporate savings, the other  two components of national savings are 
household savings and government savings. Figure 3 plots the time series of these two 
components for China and the other countries.  For household savings as a share of GDP, it is 
clear that China is in a league of its own. It is often higher than the average of the rest of the 
group by 10% of GDP, and higher than the next highest country by 5% of GDP. For 
government savings, China is one of the three highest countries in recent years. For most 
years, however, Korea has been the clear leader in the government savings rate. 
  To summarize, even if one takes the flow-of-funds data at face value, it is not clear 
that China’s corporate sector is the biggest contributor to the country’s current account surplus, 
once one adopts a cross-country perspective, especially when one looks at the net corporate 
savings rate. Both household and government savings must have played a quantitatively 
important role in driving the current account balance. 
 
3. A Close Look at Firm-level Data 
3.1 Data and summary statistics 
We employ data on 1557 publicly listed firms in China and compare them with 29330 
firms in 51 other countries from 2002 to 2007. The data source is the Worldscope. Table 1 
presents the number of firms for each country in our sample, together with national 
savings/GDP, investment/GDP, current account/GDP, and government fiscal balance/GDP, 
averaged over 2005-2007.   
A major advantage of examining firm-level data is that we can better control for 
determinants of corporate savings. An important drawback is that we exclude savings by non-
listed firms. However, if the principal reason for high corporate savings in China is 
hypothesized to be the high savings rates of its majority state-owned firms, we have an 
opportunity to observe this even with publicly listed firms only, since most big state-owned 




Table 2 lists the summary statistics for variables on corporate savings.  We define 
firm gross savings as profits minus dividends.
3 Profit is defined as Net Income (WS 01551) 
plus Depreciation (WS01151).  Dividends are the sum of cash preferred dividends (WS 05401) 
and cash common dividends (WS 05376). The net savings is gross savings minus capital 
expenditure (WS 04601). For Chinese listed companies, cash dividends are the product of 
dividends per share (WS05101) and the number of common shares (WS05301, which includes 
both tradable and non-tradable shares). To conduct comparisons across firm ownership, we 
classify a firm as majority state-owned if the state is the largest shareholder (when non-
tradable shares are also considered).      
We define gross or net savings rate as savings relative to gross asset, rather than 
savings relative to profit, because firm-level profits can be zero or negative. Table 2 reports 
the summary statistics on the gross savings rate (gross savings/assets), its components (profit 
rate and dividend rate), investment/asset, and net savings/asset for non-financial firms in 
China and other regions of the world. A few features are noteworthy. First, while the 
corporate savings rates in Asia are somewhat higher on average than those outside Asia, the 
savings rates by Chinese firms are not different from those in other Asian economies
4.  
Second, within China, there is no significant difference between majority state-owned Chinese 
firms and majority privately-owned Chinese firms in their median gross or net savings rates.  
We can also compare dividend payout practices in Table 2. An important feature for 
our purpose is that an average or median Chinese firm issues dividends no less than its 
counterparts in other countries. The median/mean of dividends over assets is 0.005/0.016 for 
Chinese firms, compared to 0/0.011 for firms in other countries. The percentage of Chinese 
firms issuing dividends was 52% in 2007, while the comparable number for the rest of the 
world was 49%.  In other worlds, while it is true that many Chinese firms do not pay 
                                                            
3 We adopt this definition of firm-level corporate savings to match more closely with that of aggregate corporate 
savings in the flow of funds data. The definition of corporate savings could be different in other settings. For 
example, if the question is related to a corporation’s access to liquidity, then it would be appropriate to include 
minority stock investment and inter-corporate loans in addition to deposit and internal cash as savings. To the 
extent that these financial assets are liquid and significant, corporate savings may be higher than currently 
reported under our definition. Also, due to data limitation, we cannot address issues like the contributions to 
enterprise savings of cross-holdings, subsidiary-to-parent SOE dividends, repos, M&A, plausible tunneling 
scenarios, FDI, etc.  
 
4 The difference in the corporate savings rates between Asia and the rest of the world lies in the mean but not in 




dividends, it is part of the common  corporate  practice around the world
5 . In addition, 
considering that the Chinese economy is growing at a faster rate than most economies in the 
world, indicative of better investment opportunities in China, the optimal dividend payout in 
China can be expected to be lower than elsewhere. A second interesting feature comes from 
comparing the dividends of state-owned Chinese companies with those of non-state-owned 
Chinese companies. State-owned companies issue slightly larger dividends than non-state-
owned companies. In 2007, 56% of state-owned companies issued cash dividends, while 45% 
non-state-owned companies did the same. Hence the mainstream view that state-owned firms 
are particularly reluctant to issue dividends due to mis-governance is not consistent with the 
summary statistics.  
 Corporate savings rates are affected by firm size and other factors. For example, firms 
in resource sectors may have extra savings due to commodity price booms in the past few 
years. Also, firms in sectors with an intrinsically higher demand for external finance may also 
save more. To control for these possibilities, we now use econometric analyses to examine 
whether Chinese listed firms have more savings.  
 
3.2 Econometric Specification 
We start with a model for gross savings rate:   
1 / ijkt ijkt k j t ijkt Savings Assets Size China Sector Year                                       (1)  
for firm i in sector j of country k at time t. Company size is the total value of book assets 
measured in current US dollars. Sector dummies are at the 3-digit level based on US Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC 1987). There are 373 three-digit (non-financial) sectors in the 
sample.  Year dummies control for the global trend. Based on this model, we will also check 
whether gross savings between Chinese state-owned and non-state-owned companies are 
systematically different.   
                                                            
5 An article in the Economist magazine (Oct 3
rd, 2009) mocked the dividend practices of Chinese firms by noting 
that “almost 45% of listed companies did not pay a dividend last year,” without apparently realizing that the 




We perform cross-country  comparisons of the components of gross 
savings: profits and dividends, using the same specification as above. Finally, we perform 
comparisons of investment rate and net corporate savings. To summarize, we conduct a 
sequence of conditional comparisons, using specification (1), but each component of the 
expression below as the dependent variable: 
GrossSavings=Profits -Dividends
=Net Savings + Investments
                                                         (2) 
  
3.3 Corporate gross savings 
In Table 3, we report the results from a regression analysis where we control for 
determinants of corporate savings. We cluster the standard errors at the country level. In 
Column 1, we compare China with the rest of the world.  Chinese firms have a higher 
coefficient of gross savings (as a share of gross assets) than other countries, but not 
statistically significant.   
We then compare China with each country by adding 51 country dummies, except for 
the U.S. which serves as our baseline case. For 21 countries with the largest numbers of 
observations, we plot their coefficients in Figure 4. We find that, conditional on sector and 
year fixed effects and firm size, the average Chinese corporate savings rate (0.44) is close to 
the median of the spectrum. Corporations in India (0.74), Australia (0.63) and the United 
Kingdom (0.46) all have higher gross savings rates. Meanwhile, these three countries all 
experienced a current account deficit during the sample period. From 2004 to 2007, the 
average current deficit over GDP was -1%, -6% and -3% for India, Australia and the UK 
respectively. This illustrates the idea that even with a high corporate savings rate, there need 
not be a current account surplus. 
Figure 4 helps to address the power of the test for the China dummy in Column 1. In 
Column 1, the coefficient of the China dummy is insignificant, so we cannot reject the 
hypothesis that Chinese firms behave in the same way as firms in other countries.  But a 
problem of Type I versus Type II errors means we can't necessarily conclude that the 
coefficient definitively equals zero either, and the data might be too noisy to allow any 




We find that China’s corporate savings rate is  not different from the global average after 
comparing the magnitude of the China dummy with those of other countries.  
So far we look at the average effect over the sample period. In Column 2, we examine 
the trend in Chinese firms’ gross savings by interacting the time trend with the China dummy. 
This interaction is negative (but insignificant), suggesting that the gross savings of Chinese 
firms did not rise from 2002 to 2007. This pattern of a relatively flat time profile of corporate 
savings contrasts with the profile of China’s current account surplus, which rose gradually 
from 2002 to 2004 and more dramatically after 2005.  This is an additional feature of the data 
suggesting that China’s corporate savings rates (relative to corporate savings rates in other 
countries) did not go up in tandem with its rising current account surplus.  
We now compare state-owned versus non-state-owned firms in Column 3.   
Conditional on sector and time fixed effects and firm size, there is no significant difference 
between the two groups, which is consistent with the unconditional pattern in Table 2. In 
Column 4, we look at the time pattern by adding the interaction of time trend and state-owned 
dummy. This interaction has a negative coefficient and is significantly different from zero at 
the 10% level. Meanwhile, the state-ownership dummy has a weakly positive coefficient. 
Taken together, this suggests that state-owned companies have slightly higher gross savings 
rates than private firms at the beginning of the sample period, but the gap declines gradually 
to become negligible.  
   As corporate savings is the difference between profits and dividend payout, we now 
look at the two components separately.  
 
3.4 Decomposing gross savings: Profits and dividends 
The patterns of coefficients for profits in Table 4 are similar to those for gross savings 
rates. China’s firms have somewhat higher profit but not significantly so (Column 1 of Table 
4). To find the country-level conditional average dividend rate, we perform a version of the 
regression in Column 1 by adding individual country dummies (regression results not reported 
to save space). We plot the estimated individual country fixed effects in the top panel of 
Figure 5. China, while below the median, is not far from it. India, Australia and the U.K. still 




 In Column 2 of Table 4, we compare the trend in China’s corporate profits rates 
during 2002 to 2007 to the global time fixed effects.  The coefficient on the interaction 
between the China dummy and the time trend is statistically insignificant, suggesting that the 
time profile of Chinese firms’ profit rates is not that different from the global trend.  
In Column 3 of Table 4, we compare majority state-owned versus non-state-owned 
firms within China. We find that majority state-owned firms have a similar profit ratio as non-
state-owned companies over the sample period. To see the time trend, we add an interaction 
term between the state-ownership dummy and the time trend. It appears that the majority 
state-owned firms used to have a higher profit rate than majority private-owned firms, but the 
pattern reversed in the later part of the sample period. 
Now we look at the dividend practices conditional on sector and year fixed effects and 
firm size (Table 5). The coefficient for the China dummy is positive but insignificant, 
suggesting that Chinese firms issue dividends at an amount at least as large as the global 
average. To find the country-level conditional average dividend rate, we perform a version of 
the regression in Column 1 by adding individual country dummies (regression results not 
reported). The estimates of the individual country effects are plotted in the bottom panel of 
Figure 5. There, Chinese firms’ conditional dividend payoff rates, on average, lie in the 
middle: for example, they are larger than those in France, Germany, Korea, Japan and the 
United States, but smaller than Thailand, South Africa, Brazil, and Sweden.  
In Column 2 of Table 5, we add the interaction term of a time trend and the China 
dummy. This interaction term is negative and significant but very small (-0.00097), 
suggesting a moderate decline over the sample period.
6 To gain further insight, we compute 
the fraction of listed Chinese companies that issued dividends in a year. The fraction is 55%, 
49%, 55%, 47%, 50% and 52% respectively from 2002 to 2007.  In other words, there was a 
mild reduction in the fraction of dividend-paying firms, but the change is overwhelmed by 
year-to-year fluctuations.   We also compute the average cash dividend per share (DPS) for 
Chinese firms. The average DPS increased over the years, from 4.74 in 2002 and 4.96 in 2003 
to 6.34 in 2006 and 7.47 cents in 2007 (the  numbers of shares per company are held constant 
                                                            
6 In October 2008, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) required listed firms that applied for 
refinancing to pay cash dividends annually in an amount no less than 30 % of its distributed profits over the past 




as  stock  splits  and  reverse  splits  and  new shares are adjusted).   Note from Column 2 in 
Table 4, there is a modest (but insignificant) decline in the profit rate of Chinese firms during 
the same period. In any case, recall from Column 2 of Table 3, there is no significant change 
in the gross savings rate over time for Chinese firms. 
In Column 3 of Table 5, we compare the dividend payout rates between majority state-
owned firms and other companies, conditional on the sector and year fixed effects and firm 
size.  Contrary to the mainstream view, we see that state-owned companies issue more 
dividends. The coefficient on the state ownership dummy is 0.002, significantly different from 
zero at the 10% level. In Column 4 of Table 5, we examine whether and how the difference 
between state-owned and other firms changes over time. The negative but insignificant 
coefficient on the interaction term suggests that there might be a narrowing of the gap over 
time, but the evidence is not statistically significant. 
 
3.5 Investment and net savings  
  To understand the corporate sector’s contribution to a country’s current account, one 
ultimately needs to look at net corporate savings--the difference between gross savings and 
capital investments. We now examine China’s corporate investments over assets by using the 
same set of right-hand-side variables for gross savings. In Column 1 of Table 6, the China 
dummy is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that Chinese firms invest more 
than the global average. To find the country-level conditional average investment rate, we 
perform a version of the regression in Column 1 by adding individual country dummies 
(regression results not reported). Again, the estimates of the individual country effects are 
plotted in Figure 5 (top panel). It is clear that Chinese firms invest more than firms in all other 
countries save two (India and Canada). From Column 2 of Table 6, Chinese firms appear to 
decrease their investment relative to assets over time when compared with a global year fixed 
effects (of generally rising investment).  
In Column 3 of Table 6, we compare the conditional investment rate by majority state-
owned firms with non-state owned firms in China.  Interestingly, an average state-owned firm 
invests less than an average non-state firm.  The gap in the investment ratio between state and 




We now examine the net savings rate in  Table 7. There is little evidence that 
Chinese firms have higher net savings as a share of total assets than firms in other countries. 
The estimated coefficient is positive but insignificant (Column 1 of Table 7). To find the 
country-level conditional average net savings rate, we perform a version of the regression in 
Column 1 by adding individual country dummies (regression results not reported). The 
estimates of the individual country effects are plotted in the bottom panel of Figure 6. We see 
that China’s net savings are smaller than more than half of the countries in the sample, 
including India, Australia and the U.K. From Column 2 of Table 6, the insignificant 
interaction term suggests that the gap between net corporate savings in China and the global 
average has not narrowed over time. 
In Column 3 of Table 7, we compare state-owned companies with non-state-owned 
ones in China. There is no significant difference between the two groups on corporate net 
savings. Column 4 of Table 7 suggests that the net savings rate might be higher for state-
owned firms at the beginning of the sample.  The trend is negative but insignificant.  Since 
there is no difference between state and non-state firms averaged over the entire sample, we 
surmise that state-owned firms may have a lower net savings rate than non-state firms in the 
latter part of the sample. The insignificant trend term reflects that year-to-year fluctuations are 
large (producing a relatively large standard error). 
 
3.5 Do financial constraints raise the savings by non-state firms? 
Recall that a key conclusion so far is that within China, private firms do not save less 
than state-owned firms. One reason that private firms need to save is concern for future 
financing constraints when good investment opportunities come along.  
We now test these arguments. The first question is how to measure external finance 
needs in a cross-country setting. Following the literature on empirical corporate finance, we 
use an index for intrinsic dependence on external finance for investment (DEF_INV). 
Specifically, we construct a sector-level approximation of a firm’s intrinsic demand on 






capital expenditures - cash flow
Dependence on external finance for investment =  ,
capital expenditures
 
where Cash flow = cash flow from operations + decreases in inventories + decreases in 
receivables + increases in payables. All the numbers are based on U.S. firms, which are 
judged to be least likely to suffer from financing constraints (during a normal time) relative to 
firms in other countries. While the original Rajan and Zingales (1998) paper covers only 40 
(mainly SIC 2-digit) sectors, we expand the coverage to around 250/373 SIC 3-digit sectors 
(following Tong and Wei, 2010).   
To calculate the demand for external financing of US firms, we take the following 
steps. First, every firm in the COMPUSTA USA is sorted into one of the SIC 3-digit sectors. 
Second, we calculate the ratio of dependence on external finance for each firm from 1990-
2006. Third, we calculate the sector-level median from firm ratios for each SIC 3-digit sector 
that contains at least 5 firms, and the median value is then chosen, to be the index of demand 
for external financing in that sector. Conceptually, the Rajan-Zingales (DEP_INV) index aims 
to identify sector-level features, i.e. which sectors are naturally more dependent on external 
financing for their business operation. It ignores the question of which firms within a sector 
are more liquidity constrained. What the DEP_INV index measures could be regarded as a 
“technical feature” of a sector, almost like a part of the production function.  To capture the 
economic concept of the percentage of capital expenditure that has to be financed by external 
funding, we winsorize the DEP_INV index to range between 0 and 1.  
We then interact this DEP_INV index with the China dummy and later with the state-
ownership dummy. The results are presented in Tables 8a and 8b. Within those sectors with a 
higher external financial dependence (i.e, higher DEP_INV), Chinese firms have higher gross 
savings than other countries (Column 1). This is because in these sectors, Chinese firms are 
making relatively higher profits than their global counterparts (Column 2). A reason might be 
that Chinese listed firms have relatively lower financing costs. Moreover, within these sectors, 
Chinese firms issue relatively higher dividends than global counterparts (Column 3), 
consistent with the argument that Chinese firms may have more access to external finance.   
Another possible interpretation on the positive coefficient on the China*DEP_INV 
interaction term in the profit function is that the contemporaneous profit rate may be a 
predictor of future investment opportunities. This regression suggests that unexplored 




intrinsic dependence on external finance  (Column 2). As a result, these firms also save 
more (Column 1).  To check the validity of this hypothesis, we look at Column 3 and find that 
the investment in these sectors is not particularly higher in China. As a result, all the gross 
savings show up as net savings as well.  
Now we focus on the sample of Chinese firms and include an interaction term of state 
dummy and external finance dependence. There we find that state companies and non-state 
companies have similar gross savings, profits and dividends payouts,  which are not affected 
by whether they are in a sector with high dependence on external finance or not.    
  At least for publicly listed firms, there is no evidence that those Chinese firms in 
sectors that are intrinsically more dependent on external finance issue smaller dividends in 
order to save more than counterparts in other countries. If corporate savings reflects concerns 
for credit constraints, the evidence suggests that Chinese firms are not more concerned about 
credit constraints than their peers in other countries. Publicly traded private firms do not 
appear to face more credit constraints than their majority state-owned counterparts. Of course, 
small non-listed private firms may very well be credit constrained and therefore need to save 
more. However, this is true everywhere in the world. In any case, the evidence is not 
consistent with the contention that mis-governance in state firms and favorable price shocks 
are the primary cause of a high and rising corporate savings rate. 
 
3.6 Do politically connected firms save less? 
  The savings rates may be uneven across privately-owned firms. One reason may be 
different degrees of political connection by firm owners, which may result in uneven access to 
financing. In other words, while private firms may have a more challenging task in accessing 
finance when they need to than state-owned firms, those private firms with better political 
connections may need to save less.
7 
                                                            
7 Other corporate governance factors may affect corporate savings too. For example, Morck, Yeung and Zhao 
(2007) suggest that enterprise insiders may hide cash from their superiors or successors by tunneling it to tax 





  We examine this possibility by  utilizing a measure of political connection 
constructed by Fan, Wong, and Zhang (2007).  The political connection is a dummy for 
companies whose chairman is a former government official. 
  The results are presented in Table 9. From Column 1, it is clear that politically better 
connected private firms do save significantly less. As Columns 2 and 3 reveal, however, the 
lower level savings does not come from less dividend payout, but instead from a lower profit 
rate. In other words, firms with better political connection simply perform worse. With a 
smaller profit, they do not pay smaller dividends or do less investment than firms without a 
strong political connection. As a result, these firms have a lower gross savings rate and a 
lower net savings rate. 
 
4. Conclusion 
  Chinese companies maintain a high gross savings rate in absolute terms, and often 
account for as big a share of GDP and household savings. This has led to the mainstream view 
that (a) corporate savings in China is a key driver of its current account surplus, and (b) high 
corporate savings is mainly a result of high savings rates by state-owned firms due to mis-
governance. 
  This paper casts doubt on both parts of the mainstream view. Using the aggregate 
flow-of-funds data, we show that corporate gross savings rates are high and have been rising 
in a number of countries. At least Korea and Japan tend to have substantially higher savings 
rates by their corporate sectors than China’s. Moreover, relative to the investment rate 
(investment/GDP), China has, in fact, the lowest net savings rate (gross savings rate – 
investment rate) among the group of major economies. It is the only country that had a 
negative net corporate savings rate every year during 1995-2007. 
  Micro firm level evidence could provide better controls for sector and year effects on 
corporate savings patterns. Once we do that, we see that Chinese corporate savings rates, both 
gross and net, are not that different from those in other economies. 
  Overall, the notion that Chinese corporate savings drives its current account surplus is 
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Figure 4: Relative Gross Savings Rates across Countries 










































Figure 5: Relative Profit and Dividend Rates across Countries Conditional on 

























Figure 6: Relative Investment Rates and Net Savings Rates across Countries  
























Table 1. Country Coverage and Basic Information 





ARGENTINA 62  0.02  0.25  0.05  0.23 
AUSTRALIA 1697  -0.06  0.22  0.06  0.27 
AUSTRIA 84  0.03  0.25 0.02  0.23 
BELGIUM 128 0.02  0.24  -0.01  0.22 
BRAZIL 276  0.01  0.18  0.03  0.17 
CANADA 1656  0.01  0.24 0.05  0.23 
CHILE 133  0.03 0.24  0.09  0.21 
CHINA 1557  0.09  0.54  0.05  0.45 
COLOMBIA 25  -0.02  0.21  0.05  0.23 
CZECH REPUBLIC  18  -0.02  0.24  0.04  0.26 
DENMARK 132  0.03  0.24  0.07  0.22 
EGYPT 42  0.02  0.21  -0.03  0.19 
FINLAND 131 0.04  0.26 0.06  0.21 
FRANCE 820  -0.01  0.21  0.05 0.21 
GERMANY 764  0.06  0.24  0.01  0.18 
GREECE 294  -0.11  0.11  -0.02  0.22 
HONG KONG  834  0.12  0.33  0.05  0.21 
HUNGARY 32  -0.07  0.17  .  0.24 
INDIA 1792  -0.01  0.36  0.03  0.37 
INDONESIA 275  0.02  0.27  0.05  0.25 
IRELAND 79  -0.04  0.23 0.04  0.27 
ISRAEL 159  0.04  0.23  0.01  0.19 
ITALY 248  -0.02  0.19  0.01  0.21 
JAPAN 3982  0.04 0.28  0.06  0.24 
KOREA (SOUTH)  1024  0.01  0.31  0.10  0.30 
LUXEMBOURG 26  0.10  0.31  0.28  0.21 
MALAYSIA 940  0.15  0.36  0.15  0.21 
MEXICO 111  -0.01  0.25  0.03 0.25 
MOROCCO 15  0.01  0.32  0.03  0.30 
NETHERLANDS 181  0.08  0.28  0.03  0.20 
NEW ZEALAND  120  -0.08  0.16  0.02  0.24 
NORWAY 217 0.16  0.39 0.20  0.22 
PAKISTAN 113  -0.03  0.18  0.01  0.21 
PERU 60  0.02  0.22  0.05  0.20 
PHILIPPINES 136  0.04  0.19  0.02  0.15 
POLAND 226  -0.03  0.19  0.00  0.22 
PORTUGAL 60  -0.10  0.13  -0.02  0.22 
RUSSIAN 84  0.09  0.31 0.12  0.22 
SINGAPORE 605  0.24  0.44  0.06  0.20 
SLOVAKIA 8  -0.07  0.21  -0.01  0.28 
SLOVENIA 12  -0.03  0.26  0.03  0.29 
SOUTH AFRICA  357  -0.06  0.14  0.04  0.21 
SPAIN 129  -0.09  0.22  0.05  0.30 
SRI LANKA  18  -0.04  0.24  -0.01  0.28 
SWEDEN 362  0.08  0.26 0.03  0.18 
SWITZERLAND 210  0.13  0.34  0.04  0.22 
THAILAND 436  0.01  0.30  0.07  0.29 
TURKEY 193  -0.05  0.16  0.07  0.21 
UNITED KINGDOM  2081  -0.03  0.15  0.00  0.18 
UNITED STATES  7899  -0.06  0.15  0.00  0.20 
VENEZUELA 16  0.14  0.39  0.13  0.25 





Table 2: Summary Statistics on Corporate Savings and Related Variables 
   variable median mean Std  # Obs
         
China    Gross Savings /Asset  0.04  0.03  0.18  3893 
Majority state-owned  Profit/Asset  0.05  0.05 0.18 3924 
  Dividend/Asset  0.01  0.01 0.02 3909 
  Investment/Asset  0.05  0.07 0.07 3939 
 Net  Savings/Asset  -0.01  -0.03  0.18  3891 
         
China   Gross Savings /Asset  0.04  0.00  0.34  2509 
Non_State_owned Profit/Asset  0.05  0.01 0.34 2525 
  Dividend/Asset  0.00  0.01 0.02 2527 
  Investment/Asset  0.04  0.06 0.07 2540 
 Net  Savings/Asset  -0.01  -0.06  0.33  2507 
         
Asia   Gross Savings /Asset  0.06  0.02  0.36  26245 
(except China & Japan)  Profit/Asset  0.07  0.04  0.36  26960 
  Dividend/Asset  0.00  0.02 0.03 26329 
  Investment/Asset  0.03  0.06 0.07 26542 
 Net  Savings/Asset  0.01  -0.04  0.38  26206 
         
All countries  Gross Savings /Asset  0.05  -0.18  1.06  125693
Except China  Profit/Asset  0.06  -0.17  1.05  128234
  Dividend/Asset  0.00  0.01 0.02 126807
  Investment/Asset  0.03  0.06 0.08 127374
 Net  Savings/Asset  0.00  -0.24  1.07  124939
         
All Countries  Gross Savings /Asset  0.05  -0.17  1.03  132812
 Profit/Asset  0.06  -0.16  1.03  135551
  Dividend/Asset  0.00  0.01 0.02 133963
  Investment/Asset  0.03  0.06 0.07 134722
 Net  Savings/Asset  0.00  -0.23  1.04  132051
Note: Due to concerns for outliers, we winsorize all variables at the top/bottom 1% (in the sample 
for all countries) before computing the summary statistics for each group. The min/max values for 
gross savings are -8.37 and 0.35, respectively. The min/max values for profit/asset, 






Table 3:  Corporate Gross Savings over Assets 
  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4 
China dummy  0.0713  0.105**     
 [0.0533]  [0.0491]     
China*Time Trend    -0.00916     
   [0.00624]     
State-owned dummy      0.00263  0.0270* 
     [0.0101]  [0.0159] 
State-owned dummy*trend        -0.00665* 
       [0.00400] 
Firm size  0.223***  0.223***  0.0582***  0.0585*** 
 [0.0754]  [0.0754]  [0.0181]  [0.0182] 
year==2003 0.0214***  0.0218***  0.00869  0.013 
 [0.00497]  [0.00502]  [0.0101]  [0.0114] 
year==2004 0.0248  0.0256  -0.0149  -0.00634 
 [0.0152]  [0.0155]  [0.0158]  [0.0176] 
year==2005 0.0171  0.0184  -0.0210*  -0.00842 
 [0.0177]  [0.0182]  [0.0114]  [0.0153] 
year==2006 0.00958  0.0114  -0.0176  -0.00108 
 [0.0369]  [0.0381]  [0.0173]  [0.0199] 
year==2007 -0.0137  -0.0113  0.0109  0.0311 
 [0.0434]  [0.0450]  [0.0125]  [0.0188] 
Sector fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 132801  132801  6402  6402 
R-squared 0.265  0.265  0.086  0.087 
Notes:  Standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * denote p-value less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
Corporate gross savings over assets is winsorized at the 1% level. Sector fixed effects are at the 3-digit level.  





Table 4: Profits over Assets 
  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4 
China dummy  0.0699  0.108**     
 [0.0538]  [0.0499]     
China*Time Trend    -0.01     
   [0.00601]     
State-owned dummy      0.00486  0.0311* 
     [0.0100]  [0.0161] 
State-owned dummy*trend        -0.00714* 
       [0.00404] 
Firm size  0.222***  0.222***  0.0586***  0.0589***
 [0.0744]  [0.0744]  [0.0177]  [0.0177] 
year==2003 0.0226***  0.0230***  0.00803  0.0126 
 [0.00501]  [0.00503]  [0.0101]  [0.0113] 
year==2004 0.0257*  0.0265*  -0.0135  -0.00438 
 [0.0149]  [0.0151]  [0.0159]  [0.0176] 
year==2005 0.0214  0.0228  -0.0228**  -0.0093 
 [0.0172]  [0.0177]  [0.0115]  [0.0153] 
year==2006 0.0167  0.0187  -0.0197  -0.0019 
 [0.0360]  [0.0372]  [0.0173]  [0.0199] 
year==2007 -0.00411  -0.00144  0.0097  0.0314* 
 [0.0405]  [0.0421]  [0.0124]  [0.0188] 
Sector fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 135540  135540  6449  6449 
R-squared 0.267  0.267  0.092  0.092 
Notes:  Standard errors in brackets; ***, **, and * denote p-value less than 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.  
Profit is winsorized at the 1% level.  Sector fixed effects are at the 3-digit SIC level. Standard errors are 






Table 5: Dividends over Assets 
   Case 1 Case 2 Case 3  Case 4
China dummy  0.000209  0.00383**     
 [0.00169]  [0.00173]     
China*Time Trend    -0.000971***     
   [0.000106]     
State-owned dummy      0.00188*  0.00314** 
     [0.00107]  [0.00155] 
State-owned dummy*trend      -0.000344 
       [0.000355
Firm size  0.00119***  0.00119***  0.00168***  0.00170**
 [0.000287]  [0.000286]  [0.000589]  [0.000596
year==2003 0.000766***  0.000805***  -0.00102*  -0.000799 
 [0.000248]  [0.000245]  [0.000612]  [0.000719
year==2004 0.00181***  0.00190***  0.000322  0.000762 
 [0.000360]  [0.000368]  [0.000667]  [0.000708
year==2005 0.00278***  0.00291***  -0.00219***  -0.00154* 
 [0.000515]  [0.000496]  [0.000836]  [0.000902
year==2006 0.00309***  0.00328***  -0.00245***  -0.0016 
 [0.000543]  [0.000515]  [0.000734]  [0.000966
year==2007 0.00334***  0.00359***  -0.00243***  -0.00139 
 [0.000586]  [0.000544]  [0.000834]  [0.00114] 
Sector fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 133952  133952  6436  6436 
R-squared 0.061  0.061  0.106  0.107 
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistically significantly different zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  







Table 6: Investment over Assets 
  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4 
China dummy  0.0140***  0.0290***     
 [0.00307]  [0.00209]     
China*Time Trend    -0.00400***    
   [0.000803]     
State-owned dummy      -0.00430**  -0.00476 
     [0.00211]  [0.00439] 
State-owned dummy*trend      0.000125 
       [0.000989] 
Firm  size  -0.000208 -0.000208  0.00947*** 0.00947***
 [0.000258] [0.000257]  [0.00163]  [0.00162] 
year==2003 -0.00207*  -0.00191*  0.000921  0.00084 
 [0.00104]  [0.00112]  [0.00242]  [0.00258] 
year==2004 0.00243  0.00278  -3.45E-05  -0.0002 
 [0.00175]  [0.00185]  [0.00295]  [0.00332] 
year==2005 0.00504**  0.00561**  -0.00805***  -0.00829** 
 [0.00213]  [0.00223]  [0.00288]  [0.00345] 
year==2006 0.00750**  0.00829**  -0.0142***  -0.0145*** 
 [0.00311]  [0.00318]  [0.00260]  [0.00367] 
year==2007 0.00856**  0.00965**  -0.0120***  -0.0124*** 
 [0.00361]  [0.00381]  [0.00269]  [0.00444] 
Sector fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 134711  134711  6479  6479 
R-squared 0.163  0.164  0.178  0.178 
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistically significantly different zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 







Table 7: Net Savings over Assets 
  Case 1  Case 2  Case 3  Case 4 
        
China dummy  0.0596  0.0789     
 [0.0517]  [0.0482]     
China*Time Trend    -0.00519     
   [0.00578]     
State-owned dummy      0.00694  0.0310** 
     [0.00982]  [0.0155] 
State-owned dummy*trend        -0.00656 
       [0.00405] 
Firm size  0.225***  0.225***  0.0491***  0.0494*** 
 [0.0756]  [0.0756]  [0.0182]  [0.0183] 
year==2003 0.0229***  0.0231***  0.00766  0.0119 
 [0.00494]  [0.00499]  [0.0104]  [0.0116] 
year==2004 0.0217  0.0221  -0.0146  -0.00621 
 [0.0155]  [0.0158]  [0.0158]  [0.0175] 
year==2005 0.0117  0.0124  -0.013  -0.000604 
 [0.0182]  [0.0187]  [0.0118]  [0.0158] 
year==2006 0.00131  0.00234  -0.00318  0.0131 
 [0.0364]  [0.0375]  [0.0176]  [0.0202] 
year==2007 -0.0235  -0.0222  0.0228*  0.0427** 
 [0.0427]  [0.0440]  [0.0129]  [0.0189] 
Sector fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations 132040  132040  6398  6398 
R-squared 0.264  0.264  0.068  0.068 
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistically significantly different zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 









Table 8a: Dependence for External Finance and Corporate Savings Behavior 
 Gross  savings  Profits  Dividends  Investment  Net  savings 
China  dummy  0.043** 0.039**  -0.002*  0.016** 0.029 
 [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.001]  [0.003]  [0.019] 
China 
dummy*DEP_INV 
0.121** 0.129**  0.005**  -0.007  0.129** 
 [0.053]  [0.053]  [0.002]  [0.005]  [0.050] 
Firm Size  0.227***  0.225**  0.001**  -0.0002  0.229** 
 [0.023]  [0.023]  [0.0001]  [0.0004]  [0.023] 
year==2003 0.024**  0.025**  0.0008***  -0.0023**  0.026** 
 [0.011]  [0.010]  [0.0001]  [0.0008]  [0.011] 
year==2004  0.027* 0.028*  0.0018**  0.0021 0.024 
 [0.015]  [0.015]  [0.0002]  [0.0013]  [0.016] 
year==2005 0.019  0.023  0.0028***  0.0046**  0.0144 
 [0.018]  [0.018]  [0.0003]  [0.0017]  [0.0191] 
year==2006 0.012  0.019  0.0031**  0.0069**  0.0043 
 [0.021]  [0.021]  [0.0003]  [0.0017]  [0.0221] 
year==2007 -0.013  -0.004  0.0034**  0.0075**  -0.022 
 [0.017]  [0.018]  [0.0004]  [0.0016]  [0.0182] 
Sector fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  119598 121988  120589  121302 118952 
R-squared  0.267 0.268  0.059  0.169 0.266 
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistically significantly different zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  






Table 8b: Financial Constraints for State and Non-State Firms in China 
 Gross  savings  Profits  Dividends  Investment  Net  savings 
State Dummy  -0.0124  -0.0105  0.00191  -0.00065  -0.0118 
 [0.0137]  [0.0138]  [0.00171]  [0.00308]  [0.0131] 
State Dummy*DEP_INV  0.0426  0.0421  -0.00121  -0.0110**  0.0539* 
 [0.0304]  [0.0300]  [0.00279]  [0.00470]  [0.0311] 
Firm Size  0.0594***  0.0595***  0.00161***  0.00915***  0.0506*** 
 [0.0193]  [0.0188]  [0.000605]  [0.00171]  [0.0194] 
year==2003 0.0121  0.0111  -0.00117*  0.00137  0.0104 
 [0.0111]  [0.0111]  [0.000613]  [0.00258]  [0.0114] 
year==2004 -0.0154  -0.014  0.000306  -0.00057  -0.0148 
 [0.0176]  [0.0176]  [0.000698]  [0.00314]  [0.0176] 
year==2005 -0.0179  -0.0202  -0.00257***  -0.00828***  -0.00974 
 [0.0125]  [0.0125]  [0.000833]  [0.00306]  [0.0129] 
year==2006 -0.0178  -0.0202  -0.00275***  -0.0149***  -0.00296 
 [0.0193]  [0.0192]  [0.000778]  [0.00267]  [0.0196] 
year==2007 0.0118  0.0108  -0.00219**  -0.0119***  0.0233 
 [0.0138]  [0.0137]  [0.000891]  [0.00285]  [0.0142] 
Sector fixed effects  Y  Y  Y  Y  Y 
Observations  5738  5783 5769  5811 5735 
R-squared  0.085  0.089 0.094  0.163 0.067 
Note: ***, ** and * denote statistically significantly different zero at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  Sector 





Table 9: Do Politically Better Connected Private Firms Save Less? 
 
   








        
Political Connection dummy  -0.485** -0.0004  -0.0386*  -0.492** 
 [0.180]  [0.0028]  [0.0197]  [0.196] 
Firm size  0.414**  0.007**  0.00324  0.436** 
 [0.123]  [0.002]  [0.0129]  [0.141] 
year==2003 -0.048  -0.009**  -0.0474**  -0.004 
 [0.0320]  [0.002]  [0.0194]  [0.034] 
year==2004 -0.402*  -0.008**  -0.0711**  -0.371 
 [0.225]  [0.002]  [0.0194]  [0.262] 
year==2005 -0.556**  -0.015**  -0.100**  -0.499* 
 [0.233]  [0.003]  [0.0162]  [0.270] 
year==2006 -0.510**  -0.014**  -0.0988**  -0.422** 
 [0.142]  [0.003]  [0.0215]  [0.154] 
year==2007 -0.454  -0.013**  -0.101**  -0.403 
 [0.343]  [0.003]  [0.0242]  [0.358] 
2-digit SIC sector fixed effects  Yes  yes  yes  Yes 
Observations 1269  1276  1278  1269 
R-squared 0.08  0.14  0.09  0.08 
        
Note: ** and * denote statistically significantly different zero at the 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Political connection 
of a firm is measured by whether the chairman of the company has political connections. Source of the data:  Fan, Wong, 
and Zhang (2007) 
 